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Abstract
In this paper we follow the tradition of applied general equilibrium modelling of the Walrasian
static variety to study the empirical viability of a double dividend (green, welfare, and
employment) in the Spanish economy. We consider a counterfactual scenario in which an
ecotax is levied on the intermediate and final use of energy goods. Under a revenue neutral
assumption, we evaluate the real income and employment impact of lowering payroll taxes. To
appraise to what extent the model structure and behavioural assumptions may influence the
results, we perform simulations under a range of alternative model and policy scenarios. We
conclude that a double dividend –better environmental quality, as measured by reduced CO2
emissions, and improved levels of employment– may be an achievable goal of economic
policy.
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1. Introduction
One of the hottest topics in environmental public economics is the viability of a double
dividend ensuing a fiscal reform. This is so both from an empirical and from a theoretical
perspective. In the first place, most empirical evidence seems to give support to the assumption
that carbon dioxide emissions are the main culprit in the spreading of the so-called greenhouse
effect. Therefore tax policies specifically targeted on polluting goods could in principle be used
to control CO2 emissions. In the second place, any fiscal reform is bound to have an additional
effect on the inefficiency of a given tax system. Whether a new tax (ecotax) or an increase in
existing taxes can be adequately designed to reduce emissions (a desirable environmental
objective) and at the same time enhance efficiency through tax recycling (a desirable policy
goal) is a question that we feel cannot be resolved only on theoretical grounds. Theoretical
arguments for and against the viability of a double dividend are clearly and concisely stated in
Goulder [1995], Bohm [1997], Bovenberg [1999], and de Mooij [1999]. 
Previous empirical work on carbon dioxide emissions in Spain by Alcántara & Roca
[1995], Antón et al [1996], and Manresa & Sancho [1997] was based on Leontief accounting
methods. It therefore omitted a complete and disagregated view of the circular flow of income
and did not fully incorporate economic behaviour and balance restrictions. Following the
seminal Shoven-Whalley [1984] modelling tradition, we present in this paper a numerical
general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy that incorporates a detailed fiscal structure.
Our aim here is to contribute to the double dividend literature by way of setting up an applied
microeconomic model that evaluates after-tax resource allocation and is thus able to compute
CO2 emission levels and efficiency indicators. Since our micro model allows for the possibility
of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium, we specifically address the question of whether
an environmental tax accompanied by a budget neutral reduction in labour payroll taxes can be
effective in promoting increased levels of employment. This strong version of the double
dividend hypothesis is known in the literature as an employment double dividend. Several
important contributions that have studied the viability of an employment double dividend
(Carraro et al. [1996], Koskela & Schob [1999], Holmlund & Kolm [2000], among others)
show that some degree of real wage flexibility and some feedback between unemployment and
real wages are a key factor in attaining a double dividend. These contributions are essentially
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analytical and deal with small size economic models. Our paper, in contrast, attempts to
provide an answer with a large size numerical model where general economic interdependence
is fully taken into account. This is also the approach followed by Glowsrod et al. [1992] and
Pireddu & Dufournand [1996] 
The numerical model is implemented using the rich data set contained in a Social
Accounting Matrix of Spain. We find that under certain conditions on the structure of the
economy it is indeed possible to obtain a double dividend. In this situation we show that a
budget neutral tax reform can yield a better environment (i.e. a reduction of CO2 emissions),
and at the same time improve the employment levels and the efficiency of the Spanish tax
system. In fact, the reported situation could be termed as a triple dividend (Holmlund & Kolm
[2000]). The first type of result is to be expected since, in general, the introduction of an ecotax
in the economy will lead to a less intensive use of the polluting energy sources and hence the
environment will improve. It is unusual, however, to find in the literature that welfare,
employment and emission levels improve once a fiscal policy of this type is implemented. The
general argument against it is that in a general equilibrium setting a new energy tax will
interact with the existing set of indirect taxes and will give rise to a less efficient (i.e., a more
distortionary) tax system provoking that the double dividend policy will fail (see Bovenberg &
de Mooij [1994], de Mooij [1999 ], and Bovenberg & Goulder [1996, 1997, and 2001])). Taxes
on energy use to improve the environment are in fact shifted to primary factors (labour and
capital) and thus the supply of these resources are distorted by the new taxes. 
In our analysis we simulate a new tax system in which an ecotax (an ad-valorem tax on
all energy goods) is introduced while payroll taxes are lowered across all production sectors
under a budget neutral restriction. However, it is not always sufficient to lower the payroll
taxes to compensate for the ecotax since the applicable tax base of both taxes are quite different
in magnitude and scope and economic structure does matter, as we will see below. When we
only consider, instead, a tax on a specific polluting energy use (i.e. a petrol tax ) the distortions
that this tax introduces into the economy are greater than the previous policy and the double
dividend does not hold.
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Another reason that helps to explain why the double dividend may be observed rests in
the inefficiency of taxation over primary factors (labour and capital) in the Spanish fiscal
system.  We have a relatively high tax on labour use compared to taxes levied on capital that in
our model (as in many others of the same type) is inelastically supplied. Hence the arguments
of Bovenberg & van ther Ploeg [1996] apply: we are in a situation where a shift from labour
taxes towards pollution taxes amounts to a shift in tax incidence from labour towards the other
immobile factor, thereby improving the efficiency of taxation. The way we model the labour
market is very simple. The demand side comes from the usual cost minimisation of competitive
firms. The supply side tries to capture an aggregate behaviour of the economy that links in a
positive way real wages and aggregate labour supply, particularly the unemployment rate.
Hence in equilibrium the model allows for an endogenous, positive unemployment rate. 
Our model, due to data restrictions, contemplates a single representative consumer and
thus the distributional aspects of various tax policies cannot be considered. Therefore we focus
our analysis on efficiency issues only. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
the assumptions and model characteristics of the general equilibrium implementation used in
the simulations. We embed all tax simulations in two main scenarios. The first one is termed
the rigid model and represents a version of the economy where the technology does not adjust
in response to changing relative prices and unemployment is kept fixed; in the second one –the
flexible version– we allow selection of techniques in primary factors in response to changing
relative prices as well as adjustments in employment levels in responses to changing market
conditions. By comparing the results in both scenarios we infer the role that flexibility
adjustments may play in the occurrence of the double dividend. This is the aim of Section 3
where results are presented and commented. Finally, we end the paper in Section 4 with a
summary of the main results.
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2. The model
2.1 An overview
The analysis we present follows the tradition of applied general equilibrium models of
the Walrasian static variety. These type of models have been seen to yield fiscal policy
simulation results that are satisfactory approximations of actual economic changes (see Polo &
Sancho [1993] and Kehoe et al [1995] for a discussion of model validation).
Applied general equilibrium models offer an integrated numerical representation of an
economy in which typical agents such as producers, consumers, the government, and the
foreign sector are duly incorporated. In essence, these models are disaggregate, microeconomic
versions of the circular flow of income where all bilateral exchanges among agents are
adequately captured, although always up to a level of operational institutional aggregation.
In our model consumption activities are those of a single representative consumer. The
consumer demands goods and savings (future consumption) under an income constraint.
Income is the result of selling endowments of labour and capital plus net transfers from the
government. The production side distinguishes 22 industries of which 10 correspond to energy
production activities. The energy industries keep the finer disaggregation present in the official
input-output table while the rest of industries are aggregated according to production
relatedness. Total output is a combination of domestic and imported outputs. Domestic output,
in turn, is the result of combining primary factors (labour and capital) with intermediate goods
following the available technological recipees. 
The government plays a singular role in the model. It produces a public consumption
good, supports public investments and provides the private sectors with income transfers. All
these government expenditures are financed through taxes and, if necessary, with a
complementary bond-financed deficit. Taxes are of two general types: a direct income tax and a
suite of indirect taxes (production tax, value-added tax, labour tax, and tariffs).
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The foreign sector plays a residual but nonetheless important role in the model. We
distinguish two foreign subsectors: the European Union (EU) and the Rest of the World
(ROW). Imports are demanded by the domestic industries and they are used to yield, along
with domestic output, the total supply of goods. Part of this total supply is in turn demanded by
the foreign sectors as exports.
In the behavioural side, all agents are maximisers and price takers. The technology
presents constant returns to scale. We consider two polar cases. In the first one —the rigid
model— there is no factor substitution, nor adjustments in the initially given fix labour supply.
In the second version of the model —the flexible model— firms can adjust their factor demands
over a smooth isoquant and, moreover, there may be adjustments in the labour market that
make the level of employment, or alternatively the unemployment rate, an endogenous
variable.
In equilibrium all markets clear with the possible exception of the labour market. All
labour is endowed to the representative consumer and we distinguish between used and
non-used labour. In the rigid version the used labour supply is totally inelastic and we have a
fix level of unemployment which is equal to the non-used part of the endowment. In the flexible
version the consumer offers all labour elastically at the going real wage up to the point of use
depletion. From here on, the labour supply becomes inelastic. If total labour demand at the
going wage by the 22 industries is less than the labour endowment, that is, it intersects the
labour supply at the elastic part, we happen to have involuntary unemployment. Notice that in
this case unemployment is endogenously determined.
2.2  A few more details
Each of the 22 industries produces an homogeneous good using a nested constant
returns to scale technology.  Let us use, for j = 1, ... , 22, the following notation:
Xj : Total output
Xdj : Domestic output
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Xej : EU imports
Xrj : ROW imports
In the first level we posit a fixed coefficients production function:
Xj = FMin(Xdj, Xej, Xrj)
In the second level, domestic output Xdj is also obtained using a fixed coefficients
technology that combines intermediate inputs Xij and value added VAj:
Xdj = FMin(X1j, X2j, ..., X22j, VAj)
Here VAj stand for value-added –a composite primary factor generated by combining
labour and capital services. In the third level of the nested technology, value-added can be
generated through two different possibilities. Under the rigid assumption we have:
VAj = FMin(Lj, Kj)
where Lj  and Kj stand for labour and capital services. Under the flexible assumption we
postulate a Cobb-Douglas substitution scheme:
VAj = FCD(Lj, Kj)
This completes the description of the technology. In a formal sense total output is
generated following an Armington [1969] rule, although a very simple one indeed since we do
not allow for substitution at the upper level of the nested technology. Under the constant
returns to scale assumption, maximum profits will be zero and firm behaviour reduces to cost
minimisation.
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On the consumption side, we have a standard utility maximisation problem. Utility
derives from consumption and savings (future consumption) and consumption plans are the
result of solving the Cobb-Douglas utility problem:
Max UCD(C1, C2, ..., C22, S)
subject to

j=1
22
pj $ Cj + pS $ S = (1 − td) $ (w $ L $ (1 − u) + r $ K + CPI $ GT)
where Cj is consumption of good j , S  represents savings, td is the direct income tax rate, w and
r are factor prices, of labour and capital respectively,  and  are the labour and capitalL K
endowment, and GT represents net transfers from the government. Prices for goods and savings
are denoted by pj and pS whereas CPI stand for a consumers price index. All prices are final
prices, therefore inclusive of all indirect taxes. Notice that not all the endowment of labour is
being necessarily used —the unemployment rate u takes care of that. Consumption demand
depends upon goods' prices and disposable income which in turn depends on factor prices and
the unemployment rate. Hence C = C(p, w, r, u).
The government collects tax income that is spent providing public consumption PUBC,
public investment PUBI, and government transfers GT to the private sector. We distinguish the
following tax categories:
DIR: aggregate income tax
IND: production indirect tax
VAT: value-added tax
SSC: payroll tax
TAR: tariffs
ECO: eco-tax.
Adding up income from all tax sources yields total tax collections TTC.  On the other hand, for
any given set of tax rates, tax collections will depend upon the applicable tax bases. For each
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tax category, the tax base depends on the interaction of prices and activity levels, thus their
endogenous character. This can be described by a tax revenue function TR:
TR = TR(p, w, r, u, X)
The government budget constraint takes the form:
PUBD = TTC- CPUB - IPUB - IPC GT$
where PUBD stands for the public deficit (or surplus). A slight rearrangement yields:
PUBC + PUBI + IPC GT = TTC - PUBD$
Under this format we clearly see the financing role that the public deficit can play.
Indeed, if the deficit is negative, the government is spending more that it collects and -PUBD
can be interpreted as a loan (bonds, for instance) from the private sector to the government.
There is a degree of freedom here. Either the level of spending is fixed —and the public deficit
becomes endogenous— or the level of the deficit is fixed —and spending turns to be
endogenous. Here we will be considering only the first option.
2.3 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is essentially Walrasian with the added touch of a macro rule
affecting the labour market. The relationship between the real wage and the unemployment rate
takes on the following form (see Oswald [1982] for a justification):
w
IPC =
1−u
1−u
1/
where u is the unemployment rate,  is the benchmark unemployment rate, and  is an elasticityu 
that measures the sensibility of the wage rate to the unemployment rate. It is worth remarking
that 1/  can be interpreted as a wage flexibility parameter. When , the wage rate is totally  = ∞
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rigid and unemployment is perfectly flexible. When , unemployment is totally rigid (and = 0
equal to the benchmark level) and the wage rate is fully flexible. In the in-between cases,
, as  increases the sensibility of the wage rate to the unemployment rate decreases. In0 <  < ∞ 
the rigid version of the model we will take , whereas in the flexible one we will assume  = 0
, with a value for  that will be taken from the econometric literature (Andrés et. al0 <  < ∞ 
[1990]).
An equilibrium is described by a vector of prices for goods and factors , a(p&, w&, r&)
vector of gross production outputs X*, a level of gross capital formation GKF*, a level of the
public deficit DPUB*, an unemployment rate u*, and a level of tax collections TTC* such as:
i) Markets for goods clear:
X& = A $ X& + C(p&, w&, r&, u&) +GKF& + PUBC + E −M(X&)
Notice that total output, , needs to cover intermediate demand, , private consumption, X& A $ X&
, gross capital formation, GKF* , government spending in public consumptionC(p&, w&, r&, u&)
PUBC, and the trade balance between a fixed demand for exports  and endogenouslyE
determined imports M(X*).
ii) Markets for factors "clear": 
 K = KD(w&, r&, X&)
L $ (1 − u&) = LD(w&, r&, X&)
where  are conditional factors' demand. KD and LD
iii) Total tax collections coincide with total tax payments from all sources by all agents:
TTC* =  TR(p*, w*, r*, u*, X*)
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iv) Total investment equals savings by all agents:
GKF& = S(p&, w&, r&, u&) +DPUB& +M(X&) − E
2.4 CO2  emissions
CO2 emissions are a natural by-product of economic activities, in particular from the
use of transformed fossil fuels in production and consumption. There is a direct "technological"
link between the level of economic activity and the level of emissions. The emission
technology is specified by fixed coefficients that show the emission volume (in metric tons) per
unit of energy good being used.  Since the equilibrium allocation depends, for a given set of
preferences and technology, upon the tax structure, any government induced change in tax rates
will affect resource allocation and therefore CO2 emissions.
The evaluation of CO2 emissions must take into account, on the production and final
demand sides, only those emissions effectively taken place on the national territory. Therefore
we should only count emissions generated in domestic production activities and in domestic
final demand ruling out in this last case any exported emissions (through any energy exports).
Total emissions can then be calculated as:
CO2 = 
k=2
11
emipj $ (
j=1
22
akj $ Xdj) + 
k=2
11
emidk $ FDk
where emip = (emip2 , emip3 , ..., emip11) is the vector of production emission coefficients, and
emid = (emid2 , emid3 , ..., emid11) is the vector of emission coefficients associated with the final
domestic use of energy goods . Finally,  are technical coefficients showing the use ofFDk akj
energy goods k = 2, 3, ..., 11, in the domestic production of  a unit of good  j = 1, 2, ..., 22.
2.5 Model calibration
Structural input-output and primary factors coefficients, as well as production and
consumption share parameters are obtained through deterministic calibration from a 1990
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Social Accounting Matrix for Spain developed by the authors. In compiling the SAM data base
the authors have made extensive used of official data such as the 1990 input-output table and
the 1990 National Products and Income Accounts. Tax parameters are likewise determined
from the same data base. All tax rates are ad-valorem effective rates, hence its levels are
inclusive of any tax evasion that may be pervading the economy. Even if there were no tax
evasion, calibrated rates would likely differ from nominal ones due to aggregation issues. The 
coefficient measuring the sensibility of the wage rate to unemployment is taken from the
estimates of Andrés et al. [1990]. Emission coefficients are adapted versions of Eurostat
estimates. Eurostat coefficients measure emissions per energy unit used in production or final
use. The model, as is standard in the literature, is implemented using fictitious physical units
that correspond to base year value units. It is therefore necessary to transform the Eurostat
coefficients into model-ready coefficients. The adaptation is undertaken using unit energy
indices available from a 1985 energy input-output table and energy price indices available from
Spain's National Statistics Institute. 
Calibration allows us to reproduce the base year data as a benchmark equilibrium
against which we are able to compare counterfactual equilibria resulting from the possible
adoption of new energy related tax policies. 
3. Ecotax and energy policies.
The two versions of the model will serve as yardsticks to appraise the spread of likely
effects ensuing the adoption of an ecotax policy. In addition to this, in each model version we
will contemplate two alternative scenarios. The first one will consist in the adoption of a new
set of tax rates on top of the existing tax rate system. In contrast, the second scenario will
maintain the aggregate real level of government tax collections by way of a compensating
decrease in Social Security contributions by employers which is the payroll tax considered in
the analysis. The rationale for this recycling of tax revenues specifically targeting the labour
market lies on the need to seek out ways that may improve labour occupation in Spain, a
persistent negative feature that has characterised the Spanish economy in the last decade.
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The following tax policies are examined. First, the adoption of a 10 percent ecotax on
the use of energy products. Second, a 15 percent increase in the effective tax rate levied on
petrol and gasoline products. Third, both previous policies applied simultaneously. A summary
of the simulation results appear in Tables I-V.
Table I shows the likely effects of adopting energy use taxes under the rigid version of
the model and with no tax revenue recycling. In this polar case, the level of total CO2 emissions
reduction could reach an up to 4 percent fall. Of these, about 19 percent could be ascribed to a
change in the structure and level of final demand and about 1 percent to the restructuring of
production activities. Both real income indicators –direct utility and money metric utility as
measured by the equivalent variation index– show a very slight fall. Since the levels of
employment and capital use are kept constant, the overall picture suggests that the slight
contraction of aggregate economic activity is entirely due to an allocation shift conducing in
turn to a substantial emissions reduction.
Table II is like table I but we consider a revenue neutral reduction in labour taxes.
Overall emissions fall but slightly less than in the previous simulation. Interestingly though,
production emissions fall a bit more and demand emissions a bit less than in the initial
simulation. All real income indicators show, again, a very small contraction of economic
activity accompanied by an allocation shift. The neutrality assumption leaves the overall
picture almost the same except for the reduction in CO2 emissions which once more signals
that an ecotax policy can be designed that is effective in noticeably lowering emissions with an
added but small efficiency cost. In this case the efficiency cost, as measured by the equivalent
variation, is clearly smaller than in the precedent simulation. Tax recycling works to temper the
original utility loss. Neither Table shows the existence of a double dividend. A better
environment comports here a definite private utility cost.
Tables III and IV display simulation results under the flexible version of the model. In
these simulations unemployment is allowed to adjust endogenously while primary factor
utilisation is governed by a smooth Cobb-Douglas isoquant. Table III exhibits the same
unrestricted ecotax policies than table I above. Table IV, in turn, shows the policies under the
same type of revenue neutral compensating scheme of Table II. Under the unrestricted policies,
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CO2 emissions would fall up to a 4.5 percent. All real income indices fall sharper than in Table
I. This is likely due to the rise in unemployment that ensues the tax increase. The output effect
that was suggested in Table I is here accompanied by a substitution effect that worsens the
overall economic picture but offers an additional bonus in emissions reduction. When we study
in Table IV the effects of the revenue neutral ecotax policies we observe that the reduction in
employers' Social Security contributions yields an added positive impetus to the economy. The
distinct reduction (of up to a 13 percent in tax rates) in the relative cost of using labour proves
to be a sufficient stimulant to substitute capital for labour and reduce unemployment under the
three policies. 
Strikingly, the pure 10 percent ecotax policy yields an increase in utility and
employment along with a 2.8 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. In the other two cases,
employment opportunities go up but real income measured by direct utility and money metric
utility fall. Empirically speaking there are two distinct double dividend situations. Column (a)
shows in fact a triple dividend situation: unemployment falls, private utility raise, and
emissions fall. In columns (b) and (c), however, utility falls while the other indicators maintain
the beneficial improvement. These two policy scenarios correspond to the strongest sort of a
double dividend, namely, the employment double dividend.
The results reported in these simulations should not be read as a "proof" of an actual
double dividend but rather as a suggestion that a conveniently designed revenue neutral tax
policy could indeed help move the economy in the direction of an eventual double beneficial
improvement. A reduction in CO2 emissions and in increase in employment levels should not
be seen as antagonistic policy objectives. The results also seem to suggest that "flexibility" in
the labour market is a desirable property for an economy to have in order to improve its
chances to achieve a double dividend. If so, policies that encourage and stimulate changes
towards flexibility should be given adequate attention and be globally evaluated by authorities.
The working hypothesis that more flexibility, in terms of lesser labour market rigidities or even
better technological adaptability, seem to imply better prospects for a double dividend should
therefore be carefully checked out. An attempt is presented in Table V where we show the
simulation results of a labour market scenario with a sensibility elasticity of   In this = ∞.
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polar case, we have a labour market situation in which the real wage is totally rigid and
unemployment is perfectly flexible.
The enhanced labour market flexibility gives rise, as expected, to a sharper fall in the
unemployment rate compared to the decrease reported in Table IV. As a result of the greater
available labour income, we observe utility gains in all three tax scenarios. The expanding
economy, however, gives rise to systematic increases in CO2 production related emissions.
There is an overall fall in carbon dioxide but this is due to the containment in emissions from
consumption. Consumers shift their consumption demand to less polluting goods and services,
whereas production activities seem to expand in a more homogeneous way in response to the
larger across the board reduction in payroll taxes. In the situation described in Table V, we
again observe the presence of a triple benefit (better environment, more employment, and
larger real income than in the base case) but it is relevant to mention the changing sign in the
level of emissions derived from production activities More flexibility in the labour market does
not necessarily yield better or dominant double dividend situations. A larger increase in output
may offset the environmental gains, as measured by CO2 emissions, associated with a more
efficient tax system.
4. Concluding remarks
Using an applied general equilibrium model of the Spanish economy implemented with
a Social Accounting Matrix we have explored the virtuality of a double dividend following the
adoption of an ecotax on energy goods. The model incorporates a few key aspects on the labour
market. First, we contemplate the possibility of involuntary unemployment in equilibrium.
Second, the real wage rate and the unemployment rate are linked through an elasticity that
measures labour market rigidities. Finally, the wage rate and the unemployment rate are
determined endogenously.
There are two main conclusions in this report. The first one is that an employment
double dividend (lower CO2 emissions and lower unemployment) is an empirical possibility
under a rather standard set of model characteristics. The second one attests to the fact that, up
to a point, a more flexible labour market responds better to the stimuli of tax policies directed
- 16 -
to contain emissions and improve labour utilisation. To achieve this double goal, revenue
neutral tax policies are necessary but not always sufficient.
The main advantage of using a general equilibrium model is its ability to capture the
fine details of resource allocation and economic interdependence in response to changing tax
parameters. A limitation of the analysis is the data base age. An operational data base is
compiled using officially published input-output tables, expenditure surveys, and national
product and income accounts. Unfortunately, these data sources are not updated with the
required, for the modeller anyway, speed and a few compromises linking and unifying them in  
a micro consistent way have to be adopted. This is the reason that simulations results showing a
double dividend should just be taken as indications of what may be possible and not as any
definite proof.
On general economic grounds, however, a strong point can be made to support energy
tax policies as a singular tool of choice for achieving a better environmental quality and a
lower unemployment at zero revenue cost.
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Table I :  Ecotax effects
i) rigid model
ii) no labour tax compensation
-4,046-0,765-3,382-%   total emissions
-18,921-4,329-15,195-%  demand emissions
-1,083-0,055-1,028-%  production emissions
-671,745-100,815-561,940-Equivalent variationa
-0,016-0,002-0,013- %  utility
16,25016,25016,25016,250Unemployment in %
   (a) + (b)(b) 15%  petrol tax (a) 10% ecotax  base situationIndicators
a: in millions of 1990 pesetas.
Table II :  Ecotax  effects
i) rigid model
ii) with labour tax compensation
-3,865-0,739-3,214-%  total emissions
-17,469-4,125-13,878-%  demand emissions
-1,155-0,064-1,091-%  production emissions
-156,512-36,868-111,768-Equivalent variationa
-0,004-0,001-0,003-%  utility
16,25016,25016,25016,250Unemployment in %
-13,044-1,728-11,416-%  in labour tax
(a) + (b)(b) 15%  petrol tax(a) 10% ecotaxbase situationIndicators
a: in millions of 1990 pesetas.
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Table III :  Ecotax  effects
i) flexible model ( = 1.25)
ii) no labour tax compensation
-4,582-0,852-3,81-%  total emissions.
-18,806-4,337-15,064-%  demand emissions
-1,749-0,158-1,573-%  production emissions
-815,239-124,393-676,540-Equivalent variationa
-1,954-0,298-0,162-%  utility
17,26016,40017,07016,250Unemployment in %
     (a) + (b)(b) 15%  petrol tax(a) 10% ecotaxbase situationIndicators
a: in millions of 1990 pesetas
Table IV :  Ecotax effects
i) flexible model ( = 1.25)
ii) with labour tax compensation
-3,457-0,697-2,820-%  total emissions
-17,110-4,081-13,520-%  demand emissions
-0,737-0,023-0,688-%  production emissions
-18,319-19,70720,928-Equivalent variationa
-0,043-0,0470,050-%  utility
15,60016,19015,62016,250Unemployment in %
-13,040-1,730-11,420-%  in labour tax 
      (a) + (b)(b) 15%  petrol tax(a) 10% ecotaxbase situationIndicators
a: in millions of 1990 pesetas 
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Table V :  Ecotax effects
i)  flexible model ( = ∞)
ii) with labour tax compensation
-2,361-0,587-1,759-%  total emissions
-16,065-3,964-12,474-%  demand emissions
0,3690,0850,375-%  production emissions
453,56926,391474,929-Equivalent variationa
1,0870,0631,139-%  utility
13,82016,02013,92016,250Unemployment in %
-16,780-2,110-15,020-%  in labour tax 
      (a) + (b)(b) 15%  petrol tax(a) 10% ecotaxbase situationIndicators
a: in millions of 1990 pesetas
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